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Abstract
Distributed learning is central for large-scale train-
ing of deep-learning models. However, they are
exposed to a security threat in which Byzantine
participants can interrupt or control the learning
process. Previous attack models and their corre-
sponding defenses assume that the rogue partic-
ipants are (a) omniscient (know the data of all
other participants), and (b) introduce large change
to the parameters. We show that small but well-
crafted changes are sufficient, leading to a novel
non-omniscient attack on distributed learning that
go undetected by all existing defenses. We demon-
strate our attack method works not only for pre-
venting convergence but also for repurposing of
the model behavior (“backdooring”). We show
that 20% of corrupt workers are sufficient to de-
grade a CIFAR10 model’s accuracy by 50%, as
well as to introduce backdoors into MNIST and
CIFAR10 models without hurting their accuracy.
1. Introduction
Distributed Learning has become a wide-spread framework
for large-scale model training (Dean et al., 2012; Li et al.,
2014a;b; Baydin et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2017; Agarwal
et al., 2010; Recht et al., 2011), in which a server is lever-
aging the compute power of many devices by aggregating
local models trained on each of the devices.
A popular class of distributed learning algorithms is Syn-
chronous Stochastic Gradient Descent (sync-SGD), using a
single server (called Parameter Server - PS) and n workers,
also called nodes (Li et al., 2014a;b). In each round, each
worker trains a local model on his or her device with a dif-
ferent chunk of the dataset, and shares the final parameters
with the PS. The PS then aggregates the parameters of the
different workers, and starts another round by sharing with
the workers the resulting combined parameters to start an-
other round. The structure of the network (number of layers,
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types, sizes etc.) is agreed between all workers beforehand.
While effective in sterile environment, a major risk emerge
with regards to the correctness of the learned model upon
facing even a single Byzantine worker (Blanchard et al.,
2017). Such participants are not rigorously following the
protocol either innocently, for example due to faulty commu-
nication, numerical error or crashed devices, or adversarially,
in which the Byzantine output is well crafted to maximize
its effect on the network.
We consider malicious Byzantine workers, where an attacker
controls either the devices themselves, or even only the
communication between the participants and the PS, for
example by Man In The Middle attack. Both attacks and
defenses have been explored in the literature (Blanchard
et al., 2017; Xie et al., 2018; Yin et al., 2018; El Mhamdi
et al., 2018; Shen et al., 2016).
In the very heart of distributed learning lies the assumption
that the parameters of the trained network across the workers
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) (Chen
et al., 2017b; Blanchard et al., 2017; Yin et al., 2018). This
assumption allows the averaging of different models to yield
a good estimator for the desired parameters, and is also the
basis for the different defense mechanisms, which try to
recover the original mean after clearing away the byzantine
values. Existing defenses claim to be resilient even when the
attacker is omniscient (Blanchard et al., 2017; El Mhamdi
et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2018), and can observe the data of
all the workers. Lastly, all existing attacks and defenses
(Blanchard et al., 2017; El Mhamdi et al., 2018; Xie et al.,
2018; Yin et al., 2018) work under the assumption that
achieving a malicious objectives requires large changes to
one or more parameters. This assumption is advocated by
the fact that SGD better converges with a little random
noise (Neelakantan et al., 2016; Shirish Keskar et al., 2017;
Kleinberg et al., 2018).
We show that this assumption is incorrect: directed small
changes to many parameters of few workers are capable of
defeating all existing defenses and interfering with or gain-
ing control over the training process. Moreover, while most
previous attacks focused on preventing the convergence of
the training process, we demonstrate a wider range of at-
tacks and support also introducing backdoors to the resulting
model, which are samples that will produce the attacker’s
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desired output, regardless of their true label. Lastly, by ex-
ploiting the i.i.d assumption we introduce a non-omniscient
attack in which the attacker only has access to the data of
the corrupted workers.
Our Contributions We present a new approach for at-
tacking distributed learning with the following properties:
1. We overcome all existing defense mechanisms.
2. We compute a perturbation range in which the attacker
can change the parameters without being detected even
in i.i.d. settings.
3. Changes within this range are sufficient for both inter-
fering with the learning process and for backdooring
the system.
4. We propose the first non-omniscient attack applicable
for distributed learning, making the attack stronger and
more practical.
2. Background
2.1. Malicious Objectives
Convergence Prevention This is the attack which most
of the existing attacks and defenses literature for distributed
learning focuses on (Blanchard et al., 2017; El Mhamdi
et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2018). In this case, the attacker inter-
feres with the process with the mere desire of obstructing
the server from reaching good accuracy. This type of attack
is not very interesting because the attacker does not gain
any future benefit from the intervention. Furthermore, the
server is aware of the attack and, in a real world scenario, is
likely to take actions to mitigate it, for example by actively
blocking subsets of the workers and observing the effect on
the training process.
Backdooring, also known as Data Poisoning (Biggio et al.,
2012; Chen et al., 2017a; Liu et al., 2018), is an attack
in which the attacker manipulates the model at training
time so that it will produce the attacker-chosen target at
inference time. The backdoor can be either a single sample,
e.g. falsely classifying a specific person as another, or it can
be a class of samples, e.g. setting a specific pattern of pixels
in an image will cause it to be classified maliciously.
An illustration of those objectives is given in Figure 1.
2.2. Existing Attacks
Distributed training is using the Synchronous SGD protocol,
presented in Algorithm 1.
The attacker interferes the process at the time that maxi-
mizes its effect, that is between lines 6 and 7 in Algorithm 1.
Figure 1: Possible Malicious objectives. 1. A normal
scenario in which a benign image is classified correctly. 2.
The malicious opponent damaged the network functionality
which now mis-classify legitimate inputs. 3. A backdoor
appear in the model, classifying this specific image as the
attacker desire. 4. The model produces the label 4 whenever
a specific pattern (e.g. a square in the top left) is applied.
Algorithm 1 Synchronous SGD
1: P 1 ← Randomly initiate the parameters in the server.
2: for round t ∈ [T ] do
3: The server sends P t to all n workers.
4: for each worker i ∈ [n] do
5: Set P t as initial parameters in the local model.
6: Train locally using its own data chunk.
CMalicious intervention
7: Return final parameters pt+1i to the server.
8: P t+1 ← AggregationRule({pt+1i : i ∈ [n]})
9: The server evaluates P t+1 on the test set.
10: return P t that maximized accuracy on the test set.
During this time, the attacker can use the corrupted workers’
parameters expressed in pt+1i , and replace them with what-
ever values it desires to send to the server. Attacks method
differ in the way in which they set the parameter values, and
defenses methods attempt to identify corrupted parameters
and discard them.
Algorithm 1 aggregates the workers values using averaging
(AggregationRule() in line 8). Some defense methods
change this aggregation rule, as explained below.
Backdooring attacks Bagdasaryan et al. (2018) demon-
strated a backdooring attack on federated learning by mak-
ing the attacker optimize for a model with the backdoor
while adding a term to the loss that keeps the new parame-
ters close to the original ones. Their attack has the benefits
of requiring only a few corrupted workers, as well as being
non-omniscient. However, it does not work for distributed
training: in federated learning each worker is using its own
private data, coming from a different distribution, negating
the i.i.d assumption (McMahan et al., 2016; Konecˇny` et al.,
2016) and making the attack easier as it drops the ground
under the fundamental assumption of all existing defenses
for distributed learning. (Fung et al., 2018) proposed a de-
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fense against backdoors in federated learning, but like the
attack above it heavily relies on the non-i.i.d property of the
data, which does not hold for distributed training.
A few defenses aimed at detecting backdoors were proposed
(Steinhardt et al., 2017; Qiao and Valiant, 2017; Chen et al.,
2018; Tran et al., 2018), but those defenses assume a single-
server training in which the backdoor is injected in the
training set for which the server has access to, so that by
clustering or other techniques the backdoors can be found
and removed. In contrast, in our settings, the server has no
control over the samples which the workers adversely decide
to train with, rendering those defenses inoperable. Finally,
(Shen et al., 2016) demonstrate a method for circumventing
backdooring attacks on distributed training. As discussed
below, the method is a variant of the Trimmed Mean defense,
which we successfully evade.
2.3. Existing Defenses
All existing defenses are working on each round separately,
so for the sake of readability we will discard the notation
of the round (t). For the rest of the paper we will use the
following notations: n is the total number of workers, m is
the number of corrupted workers, and d is the number of
dimensions (parameters) of the model. pi is the vector of
parameters trained by worker i, (pi)j is its jth dimension,
and P is {pi : i ∈ [n]}.
The state-of-the-art defense for distributed learning is
Bulyan. Bulyan utilizes a combination of two earlier meth-
ods - Krum and Trimmed Mean, to be explained first.
Trimmed Mean This family of defenses, called Mean-
Around-Median (Xie et al., 2018) or Trimmed Mean (Yin
et al., 2018), change the aggregation rule of Algorithm 1 to
a trimmed average, handling each dimension separately:
TrimmedMean(P) =
vj = 1|Uj | ∑
i∈Uj
(pi)j : j ∈ [d]

(1)
Three variants exist, differing in the definition of Uj .
1. Uj is the indices of the top-(n−m) values in {(p1)j ,
..., (pn)j} nearest to the median µj (Xie et al., 2018).
2. Same as the first variant only taking top-(n − 2m)
values (El Mhamdi et al., 2018).
3. Uj is the indices of elements in the same vector
{(p1)j , ..., (pn)j} where the largest and smallest m el-
ements are removed, regardless of their distance from
the median (Yin et al., 2018).
A defense method of (Shen et al., 2016) clusters each param-
eter into two clusters using 1-dimensional k-means, and if
the distance between the clusters’ centers exceeds a thresh-
old, the values compounding the smaller cluster are dis-
carded. This can be seen as a variant of the Trimmed Mean
defense, because only the values of the larger cluster which
must include the median will be averaged while the rest of
the values will be discarded.
All variants are designed to defend against up to dn2 e−1 cor-
rupted workers, as this defenses depend on the assumption
that the median is taken from the range of benign values.
The circumvention analysis and experiments are similar for
all variants upon facing our attack, so we will consider only
the second variant which is used in Bulyan below.
Krum Suggested by Blanchard et al (2017), Krum strives
to find a single honest participant which is probably a good
choice for the next round, discarding the data from the
rest of the workers. The chosen worker is the one with
parameters which are closest to another n−m− 2 workers,
mathematically expressed by:
Krum(P) =
pi | argmin
i∈[n]
∑
i→j
‖pi − pj‖2
 (2)
Where i→ j is the n−m− 2 nearest neighbors to pi in P ,
measured by Euclidean Distance.
Like TrimmedMean, Krum is designed to defend against
up to dn2 e − 1 corrupted workers (m). The intuition behind
this method is that in normal distribution, the vector with
average parameters in each dimension will be the closest to
all the parameters vectors drawn from the same distribution.
By considering only the distance to the closest n−m− 2
workers, sets of parameters which will differ significantly
from the average vector are outliers and will be ignored. The
malicious parameters, assumed to be far from the original
parameters, will suffer from the high distance to at least one
non-corrupted worker, which is expected to prevent it from
being selected.
While Krum was proven to converge, in (El Mhamdi et al.,
2018) the authors already negate the proof that Krum is (α-f)
Byzantine Resilient (A term coined by Krum’s authors), by
showing that convergence alone should not be the target, be-
cause the parameters may converge to an ineffectual model.
Secondly, as already noted in (El Mhamdi et al., 2018), due
to the high dimensionality of the parameters, a malicious
attacker can notably introduce a large change to a single
parameter without a considerable impact on the Lp norm
(Euclidean distance), making the model ineffective.
Bulyan El Mhamdi et al. (2018), who suggested the
above-mentioned attack on Krum, proposed a new defense
that successfully oppose such an attack. They present a
“meta”-aggregation rule, where another aggregation rule A
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is used as part of it. In the first part, Bulyan is using A
iteratively to create a SelectionSet of probably benign can-
didates, and then aggregates this set by the second variant
of TrimmedMean. Bulyan combines methods working with
Lp norm that proved to converge, with the advantages of
methods working on each dimension separately, such as
TrimmedMean, overcoming Krum’s disadvantage described
above because TrimmedMean will not let the single mali-
cious dimension slip.
Algorithm 2 describes the defense. It should be noted that on
line 6, n−4m values are being averaged, which is n′−2m
for n′ = |SelectionSet| = n− 2m.
Algorithm 2 Bulyan Algorithm
1: Input: A,P, n,m
2: SelectionSet← ∅
3: while |SelectionSet| < n− 2m do
4: p← A(P \ SelectionSet)
5: SelectionSet← SelectionSet ∪ {p}
6: return TrimmedMean(2)(SelectionSet)
Unlike previous methods, Bulyan is designed to defend
against only up to n−34 corrupted workers. Such number of
corrupted workers (m) insures that the input for each run of
A will have more than 2m workers as required, and there
is also a majority of non-corrupted workers in the input to
TrimmedMean.
We will follow the authors of this method and use A=Krum
in the rest of the paper including our experiments.
No Defense In the experiments section we will use the
name No Defense for the basic method of averaging the
parameters from all the workers, due to the lack of outliers
rejection mechanism.
3. Our Attack
In previous papers (Blanchard et al., 2017; Xie et al., 2018;
El Mhamdi et al., 2018), the authors assume that the attacker
will choose parameters that are far away from the mean, in
order to hurt the accuracy of the model, for example by
choosing parameters that are in the opposite direction of the
gradient. Our attack shows that by consistently applying
small changes to many parameters, a malicious opponent
can perturb the model’s convergence or backdoor the sys-
tem. In addition, those defenses claimed to protect against
an attacker which is omniscient, i.e. knows the data of all
of the workers. We show that due to the normal distribution
of the data, in case the attacker controls a representative
portion of the workers, it is sufficient to have only the cor-
rupted workers’ data in order to estimate the distribution’s
mean and standard deviation, and manipulate the results ac-
cordingly. This observation enables our attack to work also
for non-omniscient attacker, by estimating the properties
of the entire population through the corrupted participants
alone.
As mentioned above, the research in the field of distributed
learning, including all defenses, assumes that the different
parameters of all of the workers are i.i.d. and therefore ex-
pressed by normal distribution. We follow this assumption,
hence in the rest of the paper the “units” for attacking dis-
tributed learning models which we would like to maximize
without being noticed are standard deviations (σ).
The outline of this section will go as follows: We will first
analyze the range in which changes to the parameters will
not be detected by TrimmedMean, and upon choosing the
maxima of this range the convergence is averted. Then we
will point out a weakness in Krum to be exploited by the
attacker, claiming that the same parameters generated for
the attack on TrimmedMean can also overcome Krum. This
will lead to the conclusion that the same set of parameters
will circumvent Bulyan as well because both of its building
blocks were deceived. Finally, we show how the attacker
can find the set of parameters within the same range that
will introduce a backdoor to the system with only a minimal
impact on accuracy for the original task.
The fact that the same set of parameters was used against all
defenses is a strong advantage for this method: the attack
will go unnoticed no matter which defense the server decides
to choose, again rendering our attack more practical.
3.1. Perturbation Range
In the Trimmed Mean defense each parameter is calculated
independently, so the problem can be considered as a one-
dimension array, where each entry is the value given by a
different worker. Clearly, if we will set the vicious value
too far away from the mean, the malicious value will be
discarded easily. We thus seek a range in which we can
deviate from the mean without being detected. Since normal
distribution is symmetric, the same value zmax will set the
lower and upper bounds for the applicable changes around
the mean.
What is the maximal change that can be applied by an at-
tacker without being detected? In order to change the value
produced by TrimmedMean, the attacker should control the
median. This requires a majority of the workers, which
can be attained by finding the minimal number s of non-
corrupted workers that needs to be “seduced”. The attacker
will then use the properties of normal distribution, specifi-
cally the Cumulative Standard Normal Function φ(z), and
look for value z such that s non-corrupted workers will
probably reside further away from the mean. By setting all
corrupted workers to values in the range (µ− zσ, µ+ zσ),
the attacker guarantees with high probability that those val-
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ues will be the median and the many workers reporting the
same value will cause it to withstand the averaging around
the median in the second part of TrimmedMean.
The exact steps for finding such a range are shown in Algo-
rithm 3 as part of the convergence prevention attack.
3.2. Overcoming Krum and Bulyan Defenses
The output of Krum’s process is only one chosen worker,
and all of its parameters are being used while the other
workers are discarded. It is assumed that there exists such
a worker for which all of the parameters are close to the
desired mean in each dimension. In practice however, where
the parameters are in very high dimensional space, even the
best worker will have at least a few parameters which will
reside far from the mean.
To exploit this shortcoming, one can generate a set of pa-
rameters which will differ from the mean of each parameter
by only a small amount. Those small changes will decrease
the Euclidean Distance calculated by Krum, hence causing
the malicious set to be selected. Experimentally, the attack
on Trimmed Mean was able to fool Krum as well.
An advantage when attacking Krum rather than Trimmed
Mean is that only a few corrupted workers are required for
the estimation of µj and σj , and only one worker needs to
report the malicious parameters because Krum eventually
picks the set of parameters originating from only a single
worker.
Since Bulyan is a combination of Krum and TrimmedMean,
and since our attack circumvents both, it is reasonable to
expect that it will circumvent Bulyan as well.
Nevertheless, Bulyan claim to defend against only up to 25%
of corrupted workers, and not 50% like Krum and Trimmed-
Mean. At first glance it seems that the zmax derived for
m = 25% might not be sufficient, but it should be noted
that the perturbation range calculated above is the possible
input to TrimmedMean, for which m can reach up to 50%
of the workers in the SelectionSet being aggregated in the
second phase of Bulyan. Indeed, our approach is effective
also against the Bulyan attack.
3.3. Preventing Convergence
With the objective of forestalling convergence, the attacker
will use the maximal value z that will circumvent the de-
fense. The attack flow is detailed in Algorithm 3.
Example: If the number of malicious workers is 24 out
of a total of 50 workers, the attacker needs to “seduce” 2
workers (b 502 + 1c − 24 = 2) in order to have a majority
and set the median. 50−250 = 0.96, and by looking at the
z-table for the maximal z for which φ(z) < 0.96 we get
zmax = 1.75. Finally, the attacker will set the value of all
Algorithm 3 Preventing Convergence Attack
1: Input: {pi : i ∈ CorruptedWorkers}, n,m
2: Set the number of required workers for a majority by:
s = bn2 + 1c −m
3: Set (using z-table):
zmax = max
z
(
φ(z) <
n− s
n
)
4: for j ∈ [d] do
5: calculate mean (µj) and standard deviation (σj).
6: (pmal)j ← µj + zmax · σj
7: for i ∈ CorruptedWorkers do
8: pi ← pmal
the malicious workers to v = µ + 1.75 · σ for each of the
parameters independently with the parameters’ µj and σj .
With high probability there will be enough workers with
value higher than v, which will set v as the median.
In the experiments section we show that even a minor change
of 1σ can give the attacker control over the process at times.
3.4. Backdooring Attack
In section 3.1, we found a range for each parameter j in
which the attacker can perturb the parameter without be-
ing detected, and in order to obstruct the convergence, the
attacker maximized the change inside this range. For back-
dooring attack on the other hand, the attacker seeks the set of
parameters within this range which will produce the desired
label for the backdoor, while minimizing the impact on the
functionality for benign inputs. To accomplish that, similar
to (Bagdasaryan et al., 2018), the attacker will optimize for
the model with the backdoor while minimizing the distance
from the original parameters. This is achieved through the
loss function, weighted by parameter α as follows:
Loss = α`backdoor + (1− α)`∆ (3)
where `backdoor is the same as the regular loss but trained
on the backdoors with the attacker’s targets instead of the
real ones, and `∆ to be detailed below is keeping the new
parameters close to the original parameters.
For α too large, the parameters will significantly differ from
the original parameters, thus being discarded by the defense
mechanisms. Hence, the attacker should use the minimal
α which successfully introduce the backdoor in the model.
Furthermore, the attacker can leverage the knowledge of σj
for each parameter, and instead of using any Lp distance
directly for `∆, the difference between the parameters can
be normalized in order to accelerate the learning:
`∆ =
d∑
j=1
(
NewParamj −OldParamj
max(zmaxσj , 1e− 5)
)2
(4)
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if NewParamj − OldParamj is smaller than zmaxσj ,
the new parameter is inside the valid range, so the ratio
between them will be less than 1 and squaring it will reduce
the value, which implies lower penalty. On the other hand,
if NewParamj −OldParamj is greater than zmaxσ, the
ratio is greater than 1 and the penalty increase quickly. Some
σj can happen to be very small, so values below 10−5 are
being clamped in order to avoid division by very small
numbers. This attack is detailed in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Backdoor Attack
1: Input: {pi : i ∈ CorruptedWorkers}, n,m
2: Calculate zmax, µj and σj as in Algo 3, lines 2-5.
3: Train the model with the backdoor, with initial param-
eters {µj : j ∈ [d]} and loss function described in
equations 3 and 4.
4: V ← final model parameters.
5: for j ∈ [d] do
6: Clamp vj ∈ V to the range µj ± zmaxj σj using:
(pmal)j = max(µj−zmaxj σj ,min(vj , µj+zmaxj σj))
7: for i ∈ CorruptedWorkers do
8: pi ← pmal
4. Experiments and Results
For our experiments we used PyTorch’s (Baydin et al., 2017)
built in distribution package. In this section we describe
the attacked models, and examine the impact on the models
in the presence of different defenses for different m and
number of σ (z).
Datasets Following previous work (Xie et al., 2018; Yin
et al., 2018; El Mhamdi et al., 2018), we consider two
datasets. MNIST (LeCun, 1998), a hand-written digit iden-
tification dataset, and CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky and Hinton,
2009), a classification task for 32× 32 color images drawn
from 10 different classes.
Models For both datasets, we follow the model architec-
ture of the paper introducing the state of the art Bulyan
defense (El Mhamdi et al., 2018). For MNIST, we use a
multi-layer perceptron with 1 hidden layer, 784 dimensional
input (flattened 28× 28 pixel images), a 100-dimensional
hidden layer with ReLU activation, and a 10-dimensional
softmax output, trained with cross-entropy objective. By
using this structure, d equals almost 80k. We trained the
model for 150 epochs with batch size = 83. When neither at-
tack nor defense are applied, the model reaches an accuracy
of 96.1% on the test set.
For CIFAR10 we use a 7-layer CNN with the following
layers: input of size 3072 (32× 32× 3); convolutional layer
with kernel size: 3× 3, 16 maps and 1 stride; max-pooling
of size 3 × 3, a convolutional layer with kernel 4 × 4, 64
maps and 1 stride; max-pooling layer of size 4 × 4; two
fully connected layers of size 384 and 192 respectively; and
an output layer of size 10. We use ReLU activation on the
hidden layer and softmax on the output, training the network
for 400 epochs with a cross-entropy objective. In this setting
d ' 1M . The maximal accuracy reached in this model with
no corrupted workers is 59.6%, similar to the result obtained
in (El Mhamdi et al., 2018) for the same structure.
In both models we set the learning rate and the momentum
to be 0.1 and 0.9 respectively. We added L2 regularization
with weight 104 for both models. The training data was
split between n = 51 = 4 ·m + 3 workers, with m = 12
corrupted workers.
4.1. Convergence Prevention
In Section 3.1 we analyzed what is the maximal number of
σ away from µ that can be applied by our method, zmax.
We showed in the example that when the total number of
workers is 50, the value of z can be set to 1.75, and all
the corrupted workers will update each of their parameters
values to v = µ + 1.75 · σ. Furthermore, when the total
number of workers is greater than 50, s still may equals 2
like before, but n−sn increases, causing an increase in the
value of zmax and further possible distance from the original
mean. This can be intuitively explained given the fact that
when n increases, the chance for having outliers in the far
tails of the normal distribution increases, and those tails are
the ones to be seduced. In the following experiments, we
tried to change the parameters by up to 1.5σ, to leave room
for inaccuracies with the estimation of µj and σj .
required z In order to learn how many standard deviations
are required for impacting the network with the convergence
attack, we trained the MNIST and CIFAR10 models in
distributed learning settings four times, each time changing
the parameters by z = 0 (no change), 0.5, 1 and 1.5 standard
deviations. We did it for all the workers (m = n), on all
parameters with no defense in the server.
Table 1: The maximal accuracy of MNIST and CIFAR10
models when changing all the parameters for all the workers.
Model
σ 0 0.5 1 1.5
MNIST 96.1 89.0 82.4 77.8
CIFAR10 59.6 28.4 20.9 17.5
As shown in Table 1, it is sufficient to change the parameters
by 1.5σ or even 1σ away from the real average to substan-
tially degrade the results. The table shows that degrading
the accuracy of CIFAR10 is much simpler than MNIST,
A Little Is Enough: Circumventing Defenses For Distributed Learning
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150
ac
cu
ra
cy
epochs
Krum
Bulyan
Trimmed Mean
No Defense
No Attack
Figure 2: Model accuracy on MNIST. m = 24% and z =
1.5. No Attack is plotted for reference.
which is expected given the difference in nature of the tasks:
MNIST is a much simpler task, so less samples are required
and the different workers will quickly agree on the correct
gradient direction, limiting the change that can be applied.
While for the harder, more realistic classification task of
CIFAR10, the disagreement between the workers will be
higher, which can be leveraged by the malicious opponent.
Comparing defenses We applied our attack against all
defenses, and examined their resilience on both models.
Figure 2 presents the accuracy of the MNIST classification
model with the different defenses when the parameters were
changed by 1.5σ, over m = 12 corrupted workers which
is almost 24%. We also plotted the results when no attack
is applied so the effect of the attack can clearly be seen.
The attack is effective in all scenarios. The Krum defense
condition performed worst, since our malicious set of param-
eters was selected even with only 24% of corrupted workers.
Bulyan was affected more than TrimmedMean, because even
though the malicious proportion was 24%, it can reach up
to 48% of the SelectionSet, which is the proportion used
by TrimmedMean in the second stage of Bulyan. Trimmed-
Mean performed better than the previous two, because the
malicious parameters were diluted by the averaging with
many parameter sets coming from non corrupted workers.
Ironically but expected, the best defense strategy against
this attack was the simplest aggregation rule of averaging
without outliers rejection— No Defense. This is because the
1.5 standard deviations were averaged across all n workers,
76% of which are not corrupted, so the overall shift in each
iteration was 1.5 ∗ 0.24 = 0.36σ, which only have a minor
impact on the accuracy. It is clear however that the server
cannot choose this aggregation rule because of the serious
vulnerabilities it provokes. In case that circumventing No
Defense is desired, the attacker can compose a hybrid attack,
in which one worker is dedicated to attack No Defense with
attacks detailed in earlier papers (Blanchard et al., 2017;
Xie et al., 2018), and the rest will be used for the attack
proposed here.
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Figure 3: Model accuracy on CIFAR10. m = 20% and
z = 1. No Attack is plotted for reference.
Experiment results on CIFAR10 are shown in Figure 3.
Since fewer standard deviations can cause a significant im-
pact on CIFAR10 (see Table 1), we choose m = 20% cor-
rupt workers, and change the parameters by only 1σ. Again,
the best accuracy was achieved with the simplest aggrega-
tion rule, i.e. averaging the workers’ parameters, but still
the accuracy dropped by 28%. Krum performed worst again
for the same reason with a drop of 66%, Bulyan dropped by
52% and TrimmedMean performed slightly better but still
dropped by 45%.
Proportion of malicious workers Figure 4 shows the
proportion of corrupted workers required to attack the train-
ing of CIFAR10 model. Since Bulyan designed to protect
against up to 25% malicious workers, we tried to train the
model with different ms up to that value, and tested how
it affected the accuracy when the attacker changes all the
parameters by 1σ. One can see that Krum is sensitive even
to a small amount of corrupted workers, thus even with
m = 5% the accuracy drops by 33%. The graph shows that
as expected, as the proportion of corrupted workers grows,
the model’s accuracy decreases, but even 10% can cause
a major degradation with existing defenses other than not
defending at all, which is not a realistic option.
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Figure 4: Model accuracy with different proportion of cor-
rupted workers (m) on CIFAR10. z = 1.
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4.2. Backdooring
As before, we set n = 51 and m = 12 (24%). As a result
of the attacker’s desire not to interrupt the convergence
for benign inputs, low α and z (both 0.2) were chosen.
After each round the attacker trained the network with the
backdoor for 5 rounds. We set `∆ according to Equation 4
and set `backdoor to cross entropy like the one used for the
original classification.
Sample Backdooring For the backdoor sample task, we
chose each time one of the first 3 images from each train-
ing set (MNIST and CIFAR10) and take their desired back-
doored targets to be (y+1) mod |Y |where y is the original
label and |Y | is the number of classes.
Results are presented in Table 2. Throughout the process,
the network produced the malicious target for the backdoor
sample in more than 95% of the time, including specifi-
cally the rounds where the maximal overall accuracy was
achieved. As can be seen, for a simple task such as MNIST
where the network has enough capacity, the network suc-
ceeded to incorporate the backdoor with less than 1% drop
in the overall accuracy. The results are similar across the
different defenses by cause of the low z being used. For
CIFAR10 however, where the convergence is difficult even
without the backdoor for the given simple architecture, the
impact is more visible and reaches up to 9% degradation.
Table 2: Backdoor Sample Results. The maximal ac-
curacy of MNIST and CIFAR10 models with a backdoor
sample. n = 51,m = 24%, z = α = 0.2. The results with
no backdoor introduction are also presented for comparison.
Defense
Model MNIST CIFAR10
No Attack 96.1 59.6
No Defense 95.4 58.4
Trimmed Mean 95.4 57.9
Krum 95.3 54.4
Bulyan 95.3 54.2
Pattern Backdooring For the backdoor pattern attack,
the attacker randomly samples 1000 images from the
datasets on each round, and set their upper-left 5x5 pix-
els to the maximal intensity (See Figure 1 for examples).
All those samples were trained with target = 0. For testing
the same pattern was applied to a different subset of images.
Table 3 lists the results. Similar to the results for back-
door sample case, MNIST perfectly learned the backdoor
pattern with a minimal impact on the accuracy for benign
inputs on all defenses except for No Defense where the
attack was again diluted by the averaging with many non-
corrupted workers, and yet the malicious label was selected
for non-negligible 36.9% of the samples. For CIFAR10 the
accuracy is worse than with the backdoor sample, with a
7% (TrimmedMean), 12% (Krum) and 15% (Bulyan) degra-
dation, but the accuracy drop for benign inputs is still rea-
sonable and probably unsuspicious for an innocent server
training for a new task without knowing the expected ac-
curacy. For each of the three defenses, more than 80%
of the samples with the backdoor pattern were classified
maliciously.
It is interesting to see that No Defense was completely re-
silient to this attack, with only a minimal degradation of
1% and without mis-classifying samples with the backdoor
pattern. However, on a different experiment on MNIST with
higher z and α (1 and 0.5 respectively), the opposite occur,
where No Defense reached 95.6 for benign inputs and 100%
on the backdoor, while other defenses did not perform as
well on the benign inputs. Another option for circumventing
No Defense is dedicating one corrupted worker for the case
that No Defense is being used by the server, and use the rest
of the corrupted workers for the defense-evading attack.
Table 3: Backdoor Pattern Results. The maximal accu-
racy of MNIST and CIFAR10 models with backdoor pattern
attack. n = 51,m = 24%, z = α = 0.2. The results with
no backdoor introduction are also presented for compari-
son. Results are presented for legitimate inputs (benign) and
images with the backdoor pattern.
MNIST CIFAR10
Benign Backdoor Benign Backdoor
No Attack 96.1 - 59.6 -
No Defense 96.0 36.9 59.1 7.3
Trimmed
Mean 95.3 100. 55.6 80.7
Krum 95.2 100. 52.5 95.1
Bulyan 95.3 99.9 51.9 84.3
5. Conclusions
We present a new attack paradigm, in which by applying
limited changes to many parameters, a malicious opponent
may interfere with or backdoor the process of Distributed
Learning. Unlike previous attacks, the attacker does not
need to know the exact data of the non-corrupted workers
(being non-omniscient), and it works even on i.i.d. settings,
where the data is known to come from a specific distribu-
tion. The attack evades all existing defenses. Based on our
experiments, a variant of TrimmedMean is to be chosen
among existing defenses, producing the best results for con-
vergence attack excluding the choice of naı¨ve averaging,
which is obviously vulnerable to other simpler attacks.
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